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ABSTRACT
Economic Modeling of Urban Pollution and Climate Policy Interactions
By
Ardoin Valpergue de Masin
Submitted to the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering
On January 17, 2003
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degrees of
Master of Science in Civil and Environmental Engineering
Climate change and urban air pollution are strongly connected since they are both
partly originated by fossil fuel burning. Carbon policies certainly have impacts on air
pollution since one of their consequences is a structural change in fuel consumption.
Similarly, a policy aiming at reducing urban pollution certainly has impacts on climate
change. This thesis utilizes the MIT Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA)
model to study the interrelationships between these two types of policies. By focusing on
particulate matter (PM) as the main and most harmful urban pollutant, this thesis
develops a methodology to account for end-of-pipe abatement opportunities for PM
within the EPPA model, using engineering data for abatement costs. It then utilizes this
new capability to account for climate change and air pollution policies interactions in two
different ways.
It first develops a methodology to estimate the gains that can be generated by jointly
implementing policies on both greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The cost savings
from such a joint policy can be measured by subtracting the welfare cost of the joint
policy from the theoretical sum of the costs of the two separate policies. Taking the U.S.
as an example, Kyoto with trading as a climate policy and maintaining PM at their
current level as an urban policy, I find the savings to be less than 5% of the total costs of
implementing the policies separately.
This thesis then looks at the pollution impact of a climate policy on pollutants that
have both climate and air pollution effects. Using both an analytical model and an
empirical example, I show that the introduction of a trading system for one pollutant,
while lowering costs, can worsen emissions of another pollutant in some cases. The
empirical example involves a hypothetical policy where black carbon, one of the
components of PM, is controlled for climate purposes. With a trading system introduced
in BC between the sectors of the economy both for the U.S. and the E.U., I find that the
total particulate matter emissions increases in the U.S. while it decreases in the E.U.
Thesis Supervisor: John M. Reilly
Title: Senior Research Scientist
Thesis Reader: David H. Marks
Title: Morton and Claire Goulder Family Professor of Engineering Systems & Civil and
Environmental Engineering
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Climate Change and Air Pollution
Climate change has been for several years an important environmental, economic and
political issue. Because the consequences are for practical reasons irreversible, the global
debate about climate change involves all living human beings, but also future generations
to come. The most obvious effect is the global elevation of the temperature, thought to be
mainly induced by anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG). Since our
economies rely strongly on fossil fuel combustion to produce energy, fossil fuels being
by far the largest contributors to GHG emissions, any attempt to curb global climate
change will face intense economic and politic debate. Even the most efficiently designed
policies are likely to entail tremendous costs for society. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol, was
designed as a first step toward implementation of the goals of the Framework Convention
on Climate Change (FCCC) which was adopted in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Protocol
is the first serious attempt to define an international treaty to take action. Under the terms
of the treaty, industrialized countries are to limit their emissions from their 1990 levels by
a certain percentage (on average 5%) during the first commitment period, while
developing countries would not undergo any cap. Six specific gases are subject to these
limitations: carbon dioxide (C0 2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N2 0),
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF 6). To
enter into force, the Protocol requires the ratification of at least 55 Annex I parties
(industrialized countries) accounting for 55% of GHG emissions. At the time the thesis is
being written, the ratification of the Russian Federation would put the treaty into force.
Yet the Kyoto Protocol has been severely hit and is still affected by the U.S. decision not
to ratify the treaty1 . President G. W. Bush presented in 2002 another approach to deal
with the issue by setting voluntary targets on GHG emissions per unit of economic
activity.
Climate change is indeed a serious threat with very long-term consequences, but it is
closely related to another large environmental concern, air pollution. Burning fossil fuel
generates greenhouse gases but also all sorts of pollutants that have serious health
1The U.S are by far the largest single contributor to anthropogenic GHG emissions
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consequences. Since air pollution effects are immediate and far more visible than climate
change effects, strong actions have already been taken. In the U.S. for example,
regulations such as the National Air Ambient Quality Standards (NAAQS) have been
enforced.
Black carbon (BC), which will be further described in section 2, lies at the
intersections of these two predominant environmental concerns. Although not part of the
greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol, BC contributes to some extent to the
greenhouse effect because of its radiative properties. Furthermore, BC is one of the
components of particulate matter, thought to be the most harmful air pollutant in terms of
health impacts.
1.2 Thesis Motivations
My particular focus is on the economic costs of jointly implementing a climate and a
pollution policy. To study this issue, I have analyzed in detail and modeled current air
pollution policies related to black carbon and particulate matter. As previously
mentioned, in the case of GHGs, almost no policy is currently in place since climate
change has been an important concern only recently. Yet the story is somewhat different
for black carbon and all other so-called "urban" pollutants. Indeed, urban pollution has
been a growing concern for quite a while, and many countries, if not all, already started
to control emissions of urban pollutants because of their impacts on health. One of the
motivations of this thesis was thus to make an appraisal of current policies and current
marginal costs of abatement. My analysis indeed enables me to compare the different
stages of pollution control achieved by different countries and also enables me to
compare current marginal abatement costs across sectors of the economy. For example,
there is no a priori reason why the agriculture sector would exhibit the same marginal
abatement cost than the electric sector, given the ways policies have been developed.
I focus on the black carbon component of particulate matter because, in addition to its
contribution to air pollution, it also affects climate. While most of the greenhouse effect
is due to the increase in the radiative forcing of the Kyoto greenhouse gases, carbon
dioxide (CO2), methane (CH 4), nitrous oxide (N20), and high GWP (Global Warming
Potential) gases (e.g. prefluorocarbons (PFC), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), sulfur
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hexafluoride (SF6)), aerosols, of which black carbon is a part also affect climate through
different and more complex ways than the GHGs. Direct radiative forcing of black
carbon aerosols at the top of the atmosphere has been estimated in several studies in a
range from about +0.16 to +0.80W/m2 (Wang, 2002)2 . Those numbers must, however, be
tempered by the fact that some other aerosols (usually emitted in similar processes as
black carbon and in fixed proportions) induce a significant radiative forcing, negative for
several of them3 . And, radiative forcing measured at the top of the atmosphere may not
capture well the temperature effects of black carbon at the surface of the earth. My goal
in this thesis is limited to studying the cost of control of BC, in anticipation that the
ability to better model and estimate climate effects of BC will improve in the near future.
An in-depth study of the cost of controlling black carbon, and to a greater extent aerosols
and particulate matter, may reveal cheaper opportunities to achieve climate change
mitigation, or may reveal instead that the global effect of urban pollution control might
have little effect on climate.
With the ability to examine current pollution policies and their costs, I proceed to the
central point of this work, the interactions between urban pollution and climate policy.
Indeed, climate change policies (without any constraint on aerosols emissions) induce
changes in the structure of fuel consumption (e.g. shift from coal to cleaner fuels), which
de facto have an impact on urban pollutant emissions (most of them are linked to fuel
use). It is worthwhile comparing the costs of climate policies and the costs of air
pollution standards, seeing how such policies may interact and trying to quantify the
gains that can be achieved by implementing policies jointly. Yet the uncertainty linked to
black carbon radiative forcing certainly raises questions about the meaning of any policy
that would constrain black carbon for the sole goal of climate change control.
1.3 Previous Work
As black carbon and other urban pollutants are not part of the Kyoto-targeted
greenhouse gases, few studies were carried out about their mitigation costs as part of
climate policy. Still, many studies about abatement costs of those pollutants have been
2 By comparison, Kyoto greenhouse gases induce a radiative forcing of about 2.5 W/m2
3 A more detailed description of those issues is detailed in a comprehensive way in IPCC 2001 [1])
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done principally to study air pollution costs. Recent work in Europe, such as at the
RAINS 4 model developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis
(IIASA) in Laxenburg, Austria (Llkewille et al., 2001), developed methodologies to
obtain marginal costs of abating urban pollutants. Similarly, the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) carried out numerous studies on the costs of controlling
emissions, some with particular focus on particulate matter (e.g. EPA, 1998). Recently
however, some scientific studies have indicated a potentially important role for
controlling BC emissions as part of a climate policy, while also achieving air pollution
benefits (see Hansen et al., 2000).
New methodologies utilized at the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of
Global Change (JPSPGC) provide a way to incorporate some of detailed modeling as in
the RAINS model in a climate-oriented economic model. For example, Reilly et al.
(1999) did an extensive work on multi-gas policy assessment. Hyman (2001) also
introduced new methodologies to incorporate emission abatement in economic models
that provided a solid base for the present thesis.
Finally, the subject of the interactions between climate and air pollution has been
approached with several studies that dealt with ancillary benefits, which can be defined as
"the ancillary, or side effects, of policies aimed exclusively at climate change mitigation"
(IPCC, 2001[2]). An exhaustive list of these studies can be found in the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reports (e.g. IPCC, 2001[2], chapter 8). This
thesis does not directly estimate 'ancillary benefits', yet it deals with the rather related
subject of the interactions between climate policy and air pollution policy.
1.4 Overview of the Thesis
The main objective of this thesis is to study the interactions between climate change
policies and air pollution mitigation policies. These interactions occur because of at least
two facts. First, air pollution and the greenhouse effect are related to a certain extent
because both are emitted in burning of fossil fuels, such as coal, oil or gas. During the
combustion process, a big heap of particles pollutants, both gaseous and solid, are emitted
and have harmful effects on human health and the environment. Second, some of these
4 Regional Air Pollution Information and Simulation, see section 3.3 for more details
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pollutants have both properties at the same time, that is to say radiative properties, either
absorptive or reflective, generating de facto climate-related issues, and health impacts.
Black carbon is part of this category.
The EPPA model (Babiker et al., 2001) is an economic model developed at MIT to
study climate policies. As a part of this thesis, I have added capability to the EPPA model
to study air pollution costs. I focus my discussion on these additions to the model.
Extensive documentation and analysis of climate policy using EPPA is available
elsewhere (e.g. Babiker et al., 2002[l], Babiker et al., 2002[2], Webster et al., 2002)
As already noted, black carbon (BC), is of special interest since it has climate effects
and is also responsible for air pollution. BC is indeed one of the components of
Particulate Matter (PM), thought to be by far the most harmful urban pollutant in terms of
health damages (e.g. Curtil, 2000). I am thus interested in estimating how big an
interaction effect there is for each policy. And, I develop an approach for estimating the
economic benefit of implementing the policies together. Because both BC and C0 2, the
main GHGs, result from burning fossil fuels, I expect that a policy directed at CO 2 will
affect BC emissions. A general term for this interaction that has been used in the
literature is 'ancillary benefits', on the basis that the CO 2 policy will have the additional
benefit of reducing air pollution. I also expect that a policy directed at BC will affect CO2
emissions.
Before going through cost studies of BC abatement and more generally PM
abatement, chapter 2 discusses black carbon, including its physical properties and its
sources of emissions and abatement opportunities. Chapter 2 also reviews the current
knowledge of radiative properties of BC (linked to climate change implications) and the
health effects of particulate matter, of which BC is part.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology used to model BC and PM abatement. After a
brief introduction of EPPA, I explain how BC and PM are modeled. For that purpose, we
will see how BC emissions need to be modeled, and then how the costs of abatement of
these pollutants can be estimated. To be as precise as possible on these abatement costs,
this thesis utilizes an extended study carried out by the International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) on marginal abatement costs of emission reductions for
European countries, adapts these results to the structure of the EPPA model and develops
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a methodology to use these results for non-European countries. Finally, the last section of
this chapter performs diagnostic simulations to test the new model structure.
Chapter 4 addresses the main point of this thesis. The model structure I built in the
previous part enables me to analyze the interactions between air pollution policies and
climate policies under two different perspectives, examining hypothetical policies
implemented in the U.S., as an example. In the first section of chapter 4, I develop a
method to estimate the economic gain generated by jointly implemented policies for
climate change and pollution. I calculate separately the cost of a climate policy and the
cost of an urban policy, and sum these. I then calculate the cost of a policy that jointly
reaches the same two objectives. The gain from jointly meeting the policy is then the
difference between theses costs. The second section weighs up policy interactions in the
different way since it looks at ancillary effects of a climate policy on air pollution when
different types of policy regimes are implemented. There I consider how the introduction
of an emission trading system might affect ancillary benefits of a climate policy. To
better understand the issue, I first develop a simple analytical model. I then simulate the
EPPA model to have a better idea of what actual consequences might look like.
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2. BLACK CARBON AND ITS ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
2.1 Description
Black Carbon is one of the numerous aerosols present in the atmosphere (aerosols are
solid or liquid particles, which stay at least for some hours in the atmosphere, and the
typical size of which is in the micrometer range). Within those aerosols, the ones that
contain the carbon element can be broken up into two sorts. Organic carbon (OC), mainly
composed of organic compounds (namely carbon, oxygen and hydrogen), can be reactive
in the atmosphere. It is in contrast with black carbon, which is non reactive and which is
typically highly absorbing in the solar spectrum (Cooke et al., 1996). Both "graphitic
carbon" and "elemental carbon" are terms also associated with this class of carbon,
although the definitions differ slightly. The term "elemental" usually refers to the
"thermal and wet chemical determinations" (Penner et al., 1996), the term "graphitic
carbon" refers to the presence of carbon structure close to graphite. The term "black
carbon" refers specifically to the induced absorption of light (Penner et al., 1996). Its
chemical structure is rather similar to impure graphite and we will only refer in the
following to "black carbon" because of our interest in the particle's radiative properties.
Interestingly enough, black carbon was one of the first atmospheric pollutants to be
recognized as environmentally unfriendly (because of its visible patterns of light
absorption) but was one of the latest pollutants to be studied. Its specific properties and
effects are still highly uncertain.
A very large proportion of black carbon is in a size range with an upper bound of 2
micrometers. With measurements in the urban area of Vienna (Austria) and on a costal
site of the North Sea, Berner et al. (1996) found three modes for BC size distributions, a
sub-micron one (around 0.4pm), an ultra-fine one (around 0.1 im) and a coarse one
(around 2pm), the first being the predominant one.
2.2 Sources
There are both natural and anthropogenic sources of black carbon, however, most are
anthropogenic. The only significant natural sources are wild forest fires (EPA, 2000).
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Anthropogenic sources include incomplete combustion of fossil fuels, biofuel
consumption and high temperature industrial processes.
Industrial Fossil Fuel Combustion
Black carbon partly comes from the industrial combustion of both coal and refined
oil. However, industrial combustion processes tend to have lower emissions than
domestic devices, even in developing countries such as China (Streets, 2001). The extent
of emissions depends mainly on the type of combustion. Uncontrolled coal-fired stokers
typically have the biggest emission factors (BC emission per Joule).
Power Generation
Black carbon emissions in the power sector are generated mainly by the combustion
of coal and refined oil. Emission factors typically tend to be low since combustion
devices burn out most of the BC that is formed (Streets, 2001).
Biofuel Combustion
Most of pollutant emissions linked to biofuel combustion typically have a high carbon
content, and consequently a high content of BC. Those emissions can be divided into two
different types, differentiated by their sources: biofuel consumed by households on the
one hand and all other sorts of fires such as savannah burning, forest fires, or agriculture
fires on the other hand. Domestic biofuel includes wood combustion but also combustion
of agricultural wastes. The share of non-wood household BC emissions can be up to 50%
for India for example (Liousse et al. 1996). However, savannah and forest fires are
typically the most important sources in the "biofuel burning" category. This category of
emissions is actually the hardest to quantify because estimates of the amount of wood
burnt in tropical forests are very poor as are the amounts emitted per unit of wood under
such open burning situations. Liousse et al. (1996) estimated annual global BC emissions
due to biomass burning of about 6TgC/yr (Table 1).
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Table 1: Global Emissions of Black Carbon due to Biomass Burning
Emission Sources BC emissions (Tg Clyr)
Savannas 2.17
Tropical Forests 1.93
Agriculture Fires5  0.53
Domestic Fuel6  1
Total Biomass Burning 5.63
Source: adapted from Liousse et al. (1996)
Residential Fuel Combustion
Domestic coal combustion is an important part of BC emissions, and is largely
predominant in developing countries such as China (Streets, 2001). Almost none of
households in the developing countries utilize control devices when coal is used as a way
to heat. The fact that households in the developed countries emit a much lesser amount of
BC is mainly because very little coal is used as a residential heating fuel.
Transportation
BC also comes from the combustion of fuels - mainly diesel and jet fuel- in the
transportation sector. Emissions from diesel vehicles per unit of fuel often exceed those
from gasoline by one or two orders of magnitude (EPA, 2000; Cooke, 1999).
Industrial Processes
Several industrial processes, not related to fuel combustion, emit particulate matter,
though the share of BC is quite small. Those processes include coke production
(pyrolysis of coal), pig iron production (all stages of production are potential sources of
particulates emissions), sinter plants, aluminum production, cement production,
petroleum refining, and pulp production.
2.3 Abatement Opportunities
Industrial Fossil Fuel Combustion and Power Generation 7
Apart from switching the type of fuel or decreasing fuel consumption, several end-of-
pipe control devices enable reduction of particulate matter - and especially in our case -
BC emissions per unit of fuel consumed.
5 Includes wheat, barley, rye, corn, rice, and sugar cane
6 Includes fuel wood, bagasse, charcoal and dung
7 This section was drawn on Lukewille et al., (2001) and North Carolina State University website
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Cyclones
This type of device separates particulates from gaseous particles by forcing the gas to
change direction and the inertia of solid particles forces them to continue in their original
direction (Lukewille et al., 2001). However, cyclones are more efficient for middle-sized
particulates and its efficiency for small particulates such as BC is less.
Wet Scrubbers
In this type of device, a scrubbing liquid is injected in the flue gas stream which then
passes through a contracted area at high velocity and droplets are formed, capturing some
of the particulates. Wet scrubbers typically require a large amount of energy. Like the
cyclones, they are more efficient for bigger particulates and cannot therefore remove
many of the small-sized particulates such as BC.
Fabric Filters
Fabric Filters use bags, sheets or panels to filter the particulates. Depending on the
size of particulates targeted, different types (with different costs) of fabric filters are
utilized.
Electrostatic Precipitators
This type of control devices creates electric fields to charge the particulates and force
them to move out of the flowing gas stream. Particulates are then attracted by a collection
plate where they can be easily removed. Once again, the smaller the particulate size, the
smaller the removal efficiency. High-quality electrostatic precipitators are the most
efficient devices to remove particulates and their efficiency can go up to 99% for fine
particulates (of which BC is a part).
Finally, regular maintenance of oil fired industrial boilers decreases particulate
emissions.
Residential Coal Combustion
No end-of-pipe control device is available for residential coal combustion. The
principal way to decrease emissions is to improve the combustion process by, for
example, implementing new types of boilers. The type of coal burnt can also have an
impact on the emissions per unit of fuel.
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Biofuel Combustion
Like residential coal combustion, there are few end-of-pipe technological options to
reduce emissions from domestic biofuel combustion. A way - possibly the only one - to
decrease those types of emissions is to change the process to heat households, going from
wood or coal, to natural gas or electricity.
In the same way, agriculture fires and forest fires are of course very hard to control.
No control device can be applied to the emissions caused by fires and the only way to
decrease the emissions would be to decrease the number of fires, that are mainly utilized
to clear the fields or prepare them for the next crops - in the case of agriculture fires -.
Transportation (Residential and Industrial)
Different types of action can lead to a decrease in particulate emissions. First of all,
improving the fuel quality can have an impact on particulate emissions. Next, changes in
the engine itself can achieve a better control of the combustion process (e.g. improved
injection process, air-intake improvement, exhaust gas recirculation, etc). Finally, end-of-
pipe devices may lead to a decrease in emissions. Diesel catalysts, for example, enable an
increase in the rate of chemical reactions, accelerating oxidation of particulates.
However, a severe drawback of these devices is that they also cause the oxidation of
sulfur into SO 2 , generating sulfate particulate matters. Finally, other types of control
devices, like diesel particulate traps, act like filters to stop particulates.
Industrial Processes
Most control opportunities for industrial processes emissions (not linked to fuel
combustion) are end-of-pipe devices, which are very similar to the one utilized in
industrial (or power) fuel combustion.
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2.4 Climate Effects
Black Carbon radiative properties are potentially a concern for climate policy but, so
far, control of BC is not explicitly incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol (unlike carbon
dioxide (CO2 ), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N20), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs),
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and Sulphur hexefluoride (SF 6)). One reason for its exclusion is
the higher uncertainty in its radiative effects and the complex way it interacts with the
aerosols. For example, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2001), as
shown in figure 1, does not fully separate BC from other aerosols. A separate review of
the different studies on the contribution of BC alone to radiative forcing indicates that it
could range from 0.16 to 0.80 W/m 2 (Wang, 2002). However, due to both its scattering
and absorbing effects, BC can lead at the same time to heating of the atmosphere and to a
reduction of incoming solar radiation at the Earth's surface. As a result, BC can have at
the same time a heating and a cooling effect. In addition to that, aerosols can also have
indirect radiative effects, because of their influence on cloud albedo. Contrary to other
GHG species, aerosols are short-lived and atmospheric concentrations respond rather
quickly to changes in emissions. GHG's remain in the atmosphere in the order of decades
and centuries whereas aerosols remain on the order of days or weeks.
Figure 1: Greenhouse Effects of Several Gases and Compounds
The global mean radiative forcing of the climate system
for the year 2000, relative to 1750
Halocarbons
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Source: Taken from IPCC, 2001[1]
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2.5 Health Effects - a Brief Introduction on Particulate Matters
As previously mentioned, BC is one of the elements of which particulate matter (PM)
is composed. Health effects induced by particulate matter depend indeed mostly on the
size of the particles rather than chemical composition, or at least that is the assumption
upon which most epidemiologic studies rely. To get a better understanding of what BC
health effects are, one needs thus to give a little introduction to particulate matter.
Seinfield and Pandis (1998) give a definition of PM as "any substance, except pure
water, that exists as a liquid or solid in the atmosphere under normal conditions and is of
microscopic or submicroscopic size but is larger than molecular dimensions". Particulate
matter along with carbon monoxide (CO), sulfur dioxide (SO 2), nitrogen oxides (NOx),
volatile organic compounds (VOC) and ammonia (NH3), are major contributors to urban
and regional pollution. PM is by far the most complex component of atmospheric
pollutants: it varies widely in term of composition, size, lifetime in the atmosphere and
type of origin. PM can indeed be of primary origin (meaning emitted by a local source:
terrestrial and/or anthropogenic) or of secondary origin (formed through chemical
reaction within the atmosphere, involving primary origin gaseous pollutants). While
secondary origin aerosol properties are highly uncertain, primary sources are generally
thought to be the dominant contribution to observed concentrations. Dusek (2000) gives
an average of 80%. Table 2 gives an idea of the various components of particulate
matter.
Table 2: A non-Exhaustive List of Particulate Matter Components
Component (Chemical Symbol)
Aluminum Al Chlorine Cl Molydenum Mo Sodium Na
Ammonia NH4  Chromium CR Neodymium Nd Strontium Sr
Antimony Sb Cobalt Co Nickel Ni Sulfates SO 4
Arsenic As Copper Cu Niobium Nb Sulfur S
Barium Ba C-ORG Hi T C(oht) Nitrates NO 3  Sulf.acid H2SO 4
Beryllium Be Elem Carbon C(E) Organic Carbon C(org) Thallium TI
Bismuth Bi Fluorine F Palladium Pd Tin Sn
Boron B Gallium Ga Phosphorous P Titanium Ti
Bromine Br Gold Au Potassium K Uranium U
Cadmium Cd Indium In Potassium+(Sol) K-A Vanadium V
Calcium Ca Iron Fe Praseodymium Pr Yttrium Y
Carbonate Ion R 2CO 3  Lanthanum La Rubidium Rb Zinc Zn
C-Elem Hi T C(eht) Lead Pb Selenium Se Zirconium Zr
Cerium Ce Manganese Mn Silicon Si
Cesium Cs Mercury Hg Silver Ag
Source: adapted from California EPA website
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All those components can be divided into 6 different groups as shown in the table 3.
It is rather risky to give a estimate of the share of each PM component because it varies
widely across regions, times of the year and times of the day, but measurement done by
EPA and other groups (EPA, 2001) highlights the fact that all 6 components are
significantly present in PM2.5 and have comparable shares (i.e. same order of
magnitude). PM2.5 refers here to the particulates the size of which is less than 2.5ptm.
PM10 is another frequently used term referring to particulates less than 10 im. These
particular classes designations arise from particular pollution control policies,
recognizing the need to focus on small particulates. Recent regulating efforts have
focused particularly on PM2.5.
Table 3: A Possible PM Classification
PM Group Origin Main anthropogenic Source Main PM size
Sulfates Mainly secondary SO 2 emitted from fossil fuel e PM 2.5
(from SO 2 ) combustion
Nitrates Mainly secondary NO, from fossil fuel combustion e PM 2.5
(from NO,) and vehicle exhaust
Black Carbon Primary Vehicle exhaust, wood burning, e PM 2.5
prescribed burning
Organic Carbon Both Secondary and Vehicle exhaust, wood burning e PM 2.5
Primary
Trace Metals Mainly Primary Fossil fuel combustion, smelting e PM 2.5
Minerals Mainly Primary Dust, agriculture e PM coarse'
: PM the size of which is greater than 2.5 pm and less than 10pgm
Source: EPA (2001)
Space and Time Differences
Two particular aspects that distinguish climate change impacts and urban pollution
are time and distances. Indeed, today's pollution is induced by today's emissions whereas
today's greenhouse effect is induced by today's emissions but also emissions that
occurred across the past century. In the same way, the global climate change effect that
could occur in a hundred years from now will be caused by future 2100' emissions, but
also by today's emissions. Indeed, in the greenhouse effect, it is the fact that gases (e.g
C0 2, N20) can stay in the atmosphere for decades that contribute to really significant
impacts. Carbon dioxide (CC 2, the most important greenhouse gas) has for example an
average lifetime of over a century. On the contrary, PM2.5 (particulates the size of which
does not exceed 2.5pjm, like BC for example) usually have lifetimes in the atmosphere
that vary from days to weeks (Panyacosit, 2000). In addition, climate effects need to be
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considered as a global issue -since atmospheric gases travel all across the globe- whereas
other pollutants have long been considered as a local phenomenon. The sources of
pollution are usually very close from the locus of its impacts. Emissions of PM2.5
typically do not travel distances bigger than a couple of thousands kilometers
(Panyacosit, 2000). This conventional wisdom has changed somewhat with new work.
Recent studies (e.g. Wang, 2002) demonstrated that under certain conditions, black
carbon can travel larger distances than previously thought, with significant
intercontinental transport.
Health Impacts and other Ancillary Effects
Describing and understanding health impacts associated with urban pollutants, and
especially PM, is a broad subject, so I will limit myself to some facts that can be of
importance in understanding the goals of this thesis.
Health impacts associated with PM occur of course close to very large urban
agglomerations. External factors such as climate (e.g. pollutant transport) or topography
(e.g. cities close to a body of water, cities surrounded by mountains, etc...) may increase
significantly those effects.
PM is considered as dangerous mainly because it can penetrate the respiratory
system. As shown in table 4, the smaller the particle, the further its penetration in the
respiratory system.
Table 4: PM Penetration in the Human Respiratory System
Particle size (range) Penetration of particles
11 Im and up particles do not penetrate
7-11 grm particles penetrate nasal passages
4.7-7 gm particles penetrate pharynx
3.3 - 4.7pjm particles penetrate trachea and primary bronchi
2.1 - 3.3pjm particles penetrate secondary bronchi
1.1 - 2.2 m particles penetrate terminal bronchi
0.65 - 1. Im particles penetrate bronchioli
0.43 - 0.65pm particles penetrate alveoli
Source: adapted from Panyacosit (2000)
The role of size of particles has been thus clearly identified: it drives the penetration
of the particles. The role of the composition of the particulates is less clear: some patterns
seem to appear (e.g. (Koch, 2000) and (EPA, 2000)), but no conclusion about the role of
composition of PM can be drawn. It is indeed all the harder to separate the composition
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effect since most of -if not all- subjects have been exposed to all the components of PM,
and not only to one of them.
According to the ExternE study (European Commission, 1998), that summarizes
recent studies on air pollution impact and correlation between pollution level and health
impacts, the effects of PM on human health can vary from chronic bronchitis, chronic
coughs, congestive heart failure, lower respiratory symptoms (wheeze) or heart diseases.
Black carbon (and aerosols generally) also contributes to a reduction in atmospheric
visibility (Streets et al., 2001, Penner and Novakov, 1996).
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3. MODELING ABATEMENT OF BC
I used the EPPA model to study the interactions of climate policy and air
pollution. The EPPA model was designed to study climate policy. For my purpose, I
added to the model a capability to study policy directed towards BC and PM. In this
chapter, I briefly review the EPPA model before describing in details the additional
components I added to it.
3.1 Introduction to the EPPA Model
The Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model is a recursive
dynamic multi-sector multi-region world economy general equilibrium model developed
by the MIT Joint Program on Science and Policy of Global Change (Yang et al., 1996,
Babiker et al., 2001). The model was originally based on the General Equilibrium
Environmental (GREEN) model (Burgniaux et al., 1992). Contrary to the GREEN
model, the EPPA model was built using the MPSGE (Mathematical Programming
Subsystem for General Equilibrium, (Rutherford, 1995), (Rutherford, 1999)) within the
mathematical modelling language GAMS (Generalized Algebraic Modelling System,
Brooke, Kendrick and Meeraus, 1996), languages with specific applicability to
developing and solving Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models.
The EPPA model was designed to achieve the dual goal of forecasting greenhouse
gases emissions and assessing control policy options. It is calibrated on a 1995
comprehensive economic-energy dataset (GTAP-E8 , Hertel, 1997), that contains a
complete and detailed representation of energy systems in physical terms as well as
regional productions and trade flows in economic values. GTAP data was aggregated in
the model into 12 regions and 8 sectors (see figure 2)9. Production sectors use labor,
capital, energy resources and inputs of material from other production sectors. Each
region's representative consumer tries to maximize its utility while each production
sector within each region tries to maximize its profit. Once calibrated for the initial year
8 For more information on that, see Babiker et al (2001)
9 The version 3.0 which most of the tests were made with is currently being updated in a more
disaggregated and more geographically oriented version. However, for the purpose of simplicity, only
version 3.0 (from 1999) is presented in this thesis
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that is set in 1995, the model is solved for a sequence of static equilibria through 2100 in
five-year time steps.
Figure 2: Regions and Sectors in EPPA
Production Sectors Regions
Non-Energy Annex B
AGRIC Agriculture USA United States
ENERINT Energy Intensive Industry JPN Japan
OTHERIND Other Industries and Services EEC European Union (1995
1 (includes Transportation) members)
Energy OOE Other OECD'
OIL Crude Oil including tar sands FSU Former Soviet Union
REFOIL Refined Oil EET Central European Associates
COAL Coal Non Annex B
GAS Natural Gas CHN China
ELEC Electricity Production IND India
Consumption EEX Energy Exporting countries2
FINAL Non-Industrial Consumption BRA Brazil
DEMAND DAE Developing Asian Economies3
ROW Rest of the World
1: mainly Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Turkey, and EFTA
2: OPEC and other gas-exporting, oil-exporting and coal-exporting countries
3: South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore
3.2 Modeling BC Emissions in the EPPA Model
The EPPA model aims at tracking CO2 emissions, but as well other greenhouse gases
emissions (N 20, CH 4 and the High GWP gases) and urban pollutants (SOx, NO,
NMVOC 0 , NH 3, BC, OC"). The specific model structure and data needed to model each
of these are discussed elsewhere (see Babiker et al., 2001). My focus here is on BC and
OC. The first step is to derive an inventory of BC that can be allocated to EPPA sectors.
A significant portion of emissions from BC is linked to fuel-burning and thus tightly
linked in the model to fuel-consumption. Figure 3 gives a detailed relationship between
actual emissions and the sectors in EPPA with which they are linked.
Emissions from black and organic carbon were derived from various sources. The
previous version of the model utilized emission coefficients for fuel use derived from
Cooke et al. (1999) and emissions estimates for biomass burning from Liousse et al.
(1996). I revised these inventory estimates based on more recent data and extended the
10 Non-Methane Volatile Organic Coumpound
1 Organic Carbon
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inventories to particulate matter and black carbon. The RAINS (Regional Air Pollution
Information and Simulation) model (HASA, 2003) is one important source of detailed
(sector-fuel-technology) inventories of particulate matter (PM10 and PM 2.5) for
European countries (including Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union).
Streets (2001) develops an inventory of black carbon for China, using the RAINS
framework. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) gives as well estimates for
the USA for PM10 and PM2.5 (EPA, 2001). With these estimates, along with GTAP data
on fuel, improved emission inventories for fuel-burning were derived for regions not
covered by these data. Specifically, once detailed inventories for black carbon were
derived, they were used to calculate emission factors - the emissions per unit of economic
activity or fuel use in the sector. I then used these new emission factors for other regions
with similar economic structure.
Figure 3: BC Emissions in the EPPA Model
Emission Sources EPPA sector
Coal-Burning in Agriculture AGRIC\COAL
Refined-Oil Burning in Agriculture AGRIC\REFOIL
Savannah Burning, Agriculture Fires, Biofuel Burning, AGRIC\NO FUEL
Livestock Emission
Industrial Coal Burning ENERINT\COAL and
OTHERIND\COAL
Coal-burning for Power Generation ELEC\COAL
Refined Oil burning for Power Generation ELEC\REFOIL
Process Emission (cement, coke production, fertilizer ENERINT\NO FUEL
production, sinter prod, non-ferrous metal smelters, pulp
and paper, petroleum refineries, Pig iron production)
Refined Oil use in Industrial Transport OTHERIND\REFOIL
Refined Oil use in Household Transport FD\REFOIL
Industrial Refined Oil Burning ENERINT\REFOIL and
OTHERIND\REFOIL
Domestic Coal burning FD\COAL
Domestic Refined Oil Burning FD\REFOIL
Domestic Biofuel Burning FD\NO FUEL
As described by Mayer et al. (2000), there are a variety of reasons why these factors
may change over time. In general, EPPA projections of fuel consumption (driven by
economic growth forecast) would lead to very high levels and would produce
dramatically high emissions of urban pollutants. But those levels are unlikely because
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countries are likely to control emissions. Mayer et al. (2000) use a cross-section analysis
to find a declining relationship between GDP per capita and emissions per unit of energy
use (for further details, see Mayer, 2000). Such a relationship was implemented in the
model to reflect an increasing desire to control emissions as income levels rise. Tables 5
and 6 give an illustration of this pattern for regions of the world where detailed data was
available. This approach was useful for developing future projections of emissions of
these substances but did not provide the capability of estimating the costs of controlling
them.
Table 5: Emission Factors for PM2.5 for Selected Countries (kT/EJ)
Sector Fuel CHN USA EEC FSU EET
ELEC Coal 18.0 4.6 17.0 22.9 109.9
Refoil 13.8 4.0 8.2 3.7 8.5
Industrial Fuel Combustion Coal 18.0 11.0 3.0 5.0 21.4
(ENERINT, OTHERIND, AGRIC) Refoil 11.3 5.0 1.0 3.3 7.5
Industrial Transport (OTHERIND) Refoil 32.5 35.5 13.8 19.8 49.3
Household Coal 65.0 71.0 27.5 39.5 98.5
Refoil 22.5 1.5 11.1 6.5 10.8
Biofuel 240.0 833.3 196.7 460.0 460.0
Source: emissions were derived from the RAINS model for EEC, EET, FSU, from EPA for the USA and
from Streets et al. (2001) for China. Fuel Consumption was derived from GTAP data (used in the EPPA
model) for coal and refined-oil, and from OECD energy balances for biofuel consumption.
Note: Differences across regions may not be only due to technical efficiency of removal devices, but also to
the structure of production of the region
Table 6: Current PM2.5 Removal Efficiency
Sector Fuel CHN EEC FSR EET
Industrial Processes (no-fuel use) No Fuel 76% 94% 81% 72%
Industrial fuel combustion Coal 75% 94% 86% 90%
Refoil 0% 53% 14% 15%
Biofuel 76% n/a n/a n/a
Transport Refoil 0% 16% 0% 2%
Elec Coal 89% 98% 94% 94%
Refoil 0% 31% 15% 15%
Biofuel 90% 98% 84% 94%
Agric No Fuel 0% 0% 0% 0%
Household Coal 0% 3% 0% 0%
Refoil 0% 17% 0% 1%
_Biofuel 0% 7% 0% 0%
Source: RAINS PM module for EEC, EET and FSU,
available for the US
Streets et al. (2001) for China. No similar data was
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3.3 Modeling BC abatement
3.3.1 A Modeling Framework for Urban Pollutant Abatement
In order to analyze the abatement opportunities for urban pollutants and the
interactions with other policies such as climate policy, I required a relationship between
abatement and marginal abatement cost that is consistent with the structure of the model.
My approach was to introduce these pollutants directly into the EPPA production
functions.
The EPPA model uses constant elasticities of substitution (CES) production
functions. Each production function for each sector utilizes a wide set of inputs like
capital, labor, intermediate inputs, energy inputs. The structure of the production function
can be represented by the scheme shown in figure 4 and 5.
Figure 4: An Example of a Structure of Production: ENERINT and OTHERIND12
Domestic Sectoral Gross Output
I I
Intermediate inputs
from other sectors
I
Energy-Labor-Capital Bundle
7EVA
Energy Aggregate
Labor
Value-Added
7VA
Capital
See Babiker et al. (2001) for more details for other production sectors
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Figure 5: The Energy Aggregate Nest
Energy Input
7ENOE
Elec Non-Elec
/f\X GEN
Coal Gas Refoil
In these two structures the use of perpendicular bundles indicates a Leontieff
relationship, that is to say that the elasticity of substitution between the inputs is equal to
zero: the inputs are not substitutable. The non-perpendicular bundles indicate that the
relationship between the inputs exhibits a constant elasticity of substitution between the
inputs, and the elasticity of substitution is equal to the symbol pointed to by the arrow.
Once the framework of the production function is set, we need to insert a relationship
between the production function and emissions as well as abatement opportunities. One
typically thinks of emissions as an output of the production sector, the emissions being
the result (indeed an externality) of the production process. However, one can consider
pollutants as inputs into production (Babiker et al., 2001). Capital investments in devices
that lead to a decrease in emissions factors of a pollutant can be modeled as well by the
elasticity of substitution between the pollutants and the other input (Hyman, 2001).
As explained in section 2.2, we can relate most of the emissions of black carbon and
other particulate matter to fuel consumption. One can thus create new bundles in the
energy aggregate bundle where the pollutant input can be substituted with the fuel with a
given elasticity of substitution. For the emissions that are not related to fuel consumption
(e.g. biomass burning or process emissions), the same methodology developed by Hyman
(2001) can be applied, that is to say create a nest at the top of the structure of the
production function. In the same way, the pollutant input can be substituted by the other
inputs with a given elasticity of substitution.
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Finally, we need to deal with the fact that black carbon is emitted with a bulk of other
pollutants in fixed proportions within the same sector. Each of the abatement technology
mainly relies on filtering particulates with a certain diameter (see section 2.3) and as a
consequence, those pollutants are abated in fixed proportions. If we want to introduce this
pattern in the production function, we need thus to replace the single "pollutant input" by
a Leontieff composite.
Figure 6 exhibits the structure of a production function where the emissions are not
linked to fuel-use whereas figure 7 shows how the implementation is achieved when the
emission are linked to fuel-use13
Figure 6: A Structure of Production with a Pollutant Input at the Top (not linked with
fuel-consumption), the Example of ENERINT or OTHERIND14
Domestic Sectoral Gross Output
CBC-no fuel
BC OPM
Other inputs
Intermediate inputs
from other sectors
I
Energy-Labor-Capital Bundle
7EVA
Energy Aggregate Value-Added
7 VA
Labor Capital
13 Note: biofuel-related emissions are not considered as fuel-use in this thesis because the EPPA model
does not take into account "biofuel" inputs such as wood or wastes
1 In the structure, BC stands for black carbon and OPM for other particulate matter
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I I
Figure 7: The Energy Aggregate Nest with Pollutant Inputs
Energy Input
/YENOE
Elec Non-Elec
7 EN
"Dirty" "Dirty"
Coal Gas Refoil
GBC-coal OBC-refoil
BC OPM "Clean" "Clean" BC OPM
Coal Refoil
Once we have the modeling structure of urban pollutants abatement, we need to
find an estimate of the elasticities of substitution between the pollutant and the other
input. For that purpose, I will first derive a relationship between this elasticity of
substitution and the marginal abatement curve for the pollutant. This is the goal of next
section.
3.3.2 Derivation of the Elasticity of Substitution for Urban Pollutants
Engineering data (bottom-up analysis) can help us designing marginal abatement
curves for the pollutants (in this case particulate matter, and as a consequence black
carbon) by country, by sector and by type of fuel, which means that we can construct a
curve with abatement in abscissa and marginal abatement cost in ordinate. However, we
need to transform this data into a process where other inputs may be substituted by the
pollutant 5 . We want thus to derive a demand function for the pollutant.
The demand function for the pollutant is simply the reverse of the abatement curve. It
slopes downward as the price of the pollutant increases. The demand function can be
derived from the standard production functions in EPPA.
15 This assertion of substitution with other inputs may seem peculiar, but I previously explained that the
pollutants were to be treated as inputs to production in this model
30
As shown in figure 7, the "dirty" energy input can be obtained with two inputs: the
pollutant and the "clean" energy input. In the following, we will assume that the
industrial output - or the intermediate output - is produced with a pollutant input and
another aggregate input.
The EPPA model utilizes constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function, which
exists under a specific form. We can write the demand function and the unit production
cost as follow:
Q = A aQI I + (I1- a)Q2a (0)
C=qP +q 2 P2
Where
Q is the quantity of the output
C is the unit cost function
Q, is the quantity of the pollutant input
Q2 is the quantity of the aggregate other input
P1 is the unit price of the pollutant input
P2 is the unit price of the aggregate input
a and (1- a) are the shares of Q 1 and Q2 in factor payments
A is a scale parameter
q1 and q2 are the factor uses per unit of output
c is the elasticity of substitution between the two inputs
The marginal products of Qi and Q2 are given by:
MP - -aA 6 Q"QCDQJ
2 - (l-a)A a QaQ2MP Q22
To derive the unit cost function, we want to minimize the cost function under the
constraint Q=1. We consequently have the two following first-order conditions:
-1
MP= a (q, 1
MP2  1-a q2
l=A aq1v +(-a)q2j (2)
Given the fact that we have also:
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P,= C.MR
P2 =C.MP2
Equation (1) thus becomes:
-1
MP a q,  P, 
-
-
-(i
MP2 1-a q 2 ) P2
Some basic computations lead then to:
C 1= aI p-T+(1-a)P1-0)I
A
In the long run perfectly competitive equilibrium, the unit production cost equals the unit
price of the output (further named Po). Thus we can restate the previous equality
PO =C = a"Pl-" + (1- af P2A
Next, the unit demand function (i.e. the quantity of pollutant demanded to produce one
unit of output) can be obtained by deriving the unit cost function (see (0)) with respect to
P1.
q, = ACa j] (3)
IP AI P, P,
As previously mentioned, a is the elasticity of substitution between the pollutant
(considered as an input) and the other aggregate input.
Thus, the elasticity of substitution between the pollutant and the other aggregate input
can be simply derived once we have a curve with the abatement realized in abscissa and
the marginal abatement price in ordinate (see next section). Under the assumption that Po
is held constant, expression (3) can indeed be restated as:
Pi
Which can be written as well as:
P, = P',(I-AP
Where P 1 stands for the initial abatement price, that is to say the unit price associated
with no abatement (A=0). Our curve is here completely defined by o and Pi'.
Finally, one can point out that the marginal abatement costs that I use are end-of-pipe
solutions rather that reductions in the output, so we assume that there are no output
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effects. The price of the pollutant is anyhow very small compared to the price of the other
aggregate output. In the case of particulate matter (PM), Black carbon (BC) and organic
carbon (OC), there is indeed at least a two-order difference of magnitude between total
price for the pollutant input and the "clean" energy input (or the other aggregate input).
Table 7 gives a rough idea of the extent of this phenomenon.
Table 7: A Comparison Between Energy Prices and Pollutant Prices, EEC, 1995
Black Carbon Energy
Fuel Sector
Emissions Price Total cost Consump Price Price Total
(MT) ($/T) ($m) tion (EJ ) ($/Mbtu) ($/T) Cost ($m)
Refoil Elec 9.0E-03 1.OE+04 9.4E+01 1.98E+00 1.4E+02 6.61E+03 4
Household 1.2E-01 1.0E+04 1.3E+03 7.22E+00 7.3E+00 4.97E+04
d combustion 2.5E-03 3.0E+04 7.7E+01
Ind. Transport 3.OE-02 3. 1E+04 9.3E+i02
Subtot ind. Comb
+ transport 3.2E-02 1.0E+03 1.66E+01 1.4E+02 6.61E+03- 14_
Coal Elec 2.5E-03 7.4E+04 1.8E+02 7.50E+00 5.2E+OI 1.56E+04
Household 1.7E-02 3.8E+02 6.4E+00 2.60E-01 1.4E+00 3.38E+02.
Ind. Combustion 5.5E-04 3.8E+04 2.1E+O1 2.15E+00 5.2E+OI 4.28E+02 : 4
Sources: Rains PM module for BC prices and emissions, EIA website for energy prices, GTAP for energy
consumption (adapted for the EPPA model), and author's calculation (1EJ=0.948E15 BTU; 1 EJ = 23.88
MTOE; lMTCE=0.025EJ)
3.3.3 Derivation of the MAC Curves (Baseline and "no Control") for European
Countries
As explained in section 3.3.1, we need to build relationships between abatement and
marginal abatement price such as:
P, = P|, 
.
A
The RAINS model, developed at the International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis (IIASA), gives a very detailed inventory of particulate matter (of which black
carbon is a component), as well as marginal abatement costs for each European countries
(which covers the following EPPA regions: EEC, EET, FSU), by sector, by fuel and by
technology. It is given for two types of scenarios. The "baseline" scenario gives the
current abatement opportunities whereas the "no control" scenario projects what
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emissions and abatement opportunities would be if no control at all was applied. The
value of the "no control" data is not obvious at first sight. It can be very helpful though
since the no control abatement curve can be used to derive "baseline" marginal abatement
curves for regions which we do not have data for, as long as we can estimate the level of
control (that of course defines perfectly the position of a country on the "no control"
abatement curve) and assuming technological options are similar across regions.
One can indeed prove that the elasticity of substitution for the "no control curve" is
the same as the elasticity for the "baseline" curve. Let us be more specific about that and
let us suppose that with data from EEC, EET and FSU we can construct a "no control"
marginal abatement curve for a given sector and for a given type of fuel use. Let us
suppose as well that we modeled it so that the relationship between price and abatement
is the following:
p = pno-controj (1)
1 I- Anc (P)) 1
Where ponocontrol is the initial abatement price and An, is the abatement realized from the
state where no control is applied.
Now let us assume that we know the level of control (or abatement) for two countries,
for example a developing one, country 1, and a developed one, country 2. We can assert
thus that the countries have achieved the following "level of abatement" (A1,P1) and
(A2 ,P2 ) (see figure 8). Given this data, our goal is now to construct two "baseline" MAC
curves for the two specified countries.
We now want to build a relationship between the marginal abatement price, P, and the
abatement realized when taking the current baseline emission as the reference, Ab(P). In
our example, Anc(country 1)=AI and Ab(country 1)=O%
Anc, Ab and A1 are tightened by the following relationship:
Ab - " 1 - (2)
1- A,
Now let us inject (2) in (1):
no -control ( P no contro(
Finally,(b - Aapplyi - A, ( AP- A7w 1 - Aw (Pt tht
Finally, by applying (1) to (A1,P1), we can write that:
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pbaseline p _ no _control0 1- A)
We can now re-write (3) as:
p _ pbaseline
0 1-Ac ())
The above result is rather simple. The elasticity of substitution of the "baseline" MAC
curve is the same as the elasticity of substitution of the "no control" MAC curve that was
used to derive our "baseline" MAC curve. Applying expression (4) to the developing
country and the developed country we chose, we can now reformulate the "baseline"
MAC curves and plot them. Both plots have the same scales for the x-axis and the y-axis,
so that the curves can be compared. However, the definition of abatement is different for
the two plots. In the first one (figure 8), the x-axis is the abatement realized from a no
control state whereas the x-axis in the second plot (see figure 9) is the abatement realized
from the current state. In figure 8, there is only one curve, a theoretical "no control"
abatement curve, which is the same for each country. At time 0 (say today), each country
has already achieved a certain level of abatement. Here, the developed country is situated
on the right of the developing one, assuming that the developed country has currently a
higher level of abatement. What we are interested in is the cost today for each of these
two countries to achieve further abatement, for example: what is the marginal price of
abating 5% of current emissions for each of these two countries? To answer this question,
we need another plot (that is to say figure 9) for both countries that shows the marginal
abatement price of further abating given emissions. Contrary to the previous plot, the
curve will depend on the country since the curve intersects the y-axis at current marginal
price. The curve for the developed country will thus be located higher than the curve for
the developing country.
The "baseline" MAC curves are thus defined by the elasticity of substitution and the
current initial marginal abatement cost.
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Figure 8: "No Control" Marginal Abatement Curve 16
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Figure 9: "Baseline" Marginal Abatement Curves Derived from "no Control" Curves
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One should keep in mind however that this easy transformation holds only if the
marginal abatement price and the abatement are described by a relationship like (1). Even
16 Note: the scale chosen are of course arbitrary
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if the relationships exhibited by the actual data are somewhat close to relationship (1), it
is only an approximation and our methodology has to be carefully applied. Indeed, for
some sectors (see the use of coal in the power sector in the following section for
example), the above transformation leads to a wrong approximation. One way to check
whether we can apply this relationship is to look at a region for which we have both
"baseline" and " no control" data and compare the two methodologies.
3.3.4 "No control" Abatement Curves for European Countries
Using the RAINS model data (IIASA, 2003), I fit the actual data into the relationship
we are looking for, that is to say:
P no _control
0 
- Anc (P)
For that purpose, I performed linear regression on (log(P), log (1-A)). Table 8 sums
up all the results (elasticities of substitution and initial prices by sector and fuel). The
RAINS data is provided for PM2.5 and not for BC or any other pollutant. However, as
BC is a fixed share of PM2.5 (although this share depends upon sectors and fuel use), the
MAC curve for BC is identical as the one for PM2.5, except for the y-axis scale (price
per kilograms of pollutant abated). I thus present results for PM2.5, not for BC, to be
consistent with the data source.
Figure 10 provides a graphic example on how the RAINS data is utilized in this
thesis, for the industrial transportation sector. On this chart, I plotted three curves for
the 3 EPPA regions I was able to aggregate, namely EEC, EET and FSU and I plotted the
result of the regression. The abscissa difference between two points represents the
percentage abatement that can be achieved through a particular technology and the
ordinate of the point located on the right represents the marginal cost of using such a
technology, these data therefore represent the marginal addition one can obtain at
successively higher prices. As mentioned in the explanatory note of table 8, the
regression was performed on all points (EEC, EET, FSU), to fit a continuous smoothed
curve for the three regions that can be processed by the EPPA model (see equation (4)
above).
17 The corresponding EPPA sector is OTHERIND / REFOIL
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Table 8: Summary Table of Elasticities Estimates
Type of Initial price no Note on EEC EEC initial
fuel used EPPA Sector Elasticity of substitution control ($/T) R square available data elasticity price ($/T)
1.29 82, 0.82, No data afterCOAL ELEC 0.81 (after 80%), 100 (after 80%), 0.74(after 80%), 0.56 1472
0.56 (after 95%.) 284 (after 95%) 0.56 (after 95%) 7
OTHERIND! .4 0.65 41, 0.73, No data after 06 8COAL ENETERI / RIC 0.45 (after 80%) 136 (after 80%), 0.68 (after 80%), 100$ag 0.64 988
0.37 (after 90%) 302 (after 95%) 0.58 (after 90%)
No data after
COAL HOUSEHOLD 0.24 94 0.59 50% abatement 0.30 190
(1.5$/kg)
REFOIL ELEC 0.73 3124 0.81 No data after 0.83 5772500$/kg
REFOIL OTHERIND 0.31 6257 0.91 No data after 0.33 9616(Industrial Transportation) 800$/kg
OTHERIND/
REFOIL ENERINT / AGRIC 0.359 1530 0.79 No data after n/a 16000
(Industrial Combustion) 800$/kg
REFOIL HOUSEHOLD 0.26 (EEC), 3091 (EEC), 0.93 (EEC), No data after 0.23 57250.18 (EET, FSR) 12092 (EET) 0.78 (EET, FSU) 3000$/kg
ENERINT 0.71.10, 200, 0.89, No data after 0.0 23NO FUEL (Industial Process) 0.67 (after 70%) 210 (after 70%), 0.86(after 70%), 10$/kg 0.80 2730
0.64 (after 90%) 1018 (after 95%) 0.89 (after 90%.)
NO FUEL AGRIC 0 N/a N/a No data available N/a N/a
No data after
NO FUEL HOUSEHOLD 0.36 24 0.49 2$/kg (75% 0.57 88
1_ _ _ 1 abatement)
Explanatory note: Elasticities of substitutions and initial prices were calculated with the "no control" MAC curves of the three regions (EEC, EET, FSU). For
information, the last two columns show the results of regressions on the "baseline" curves for the EEC regions. For some sectors/fuel (e.g. industrial coal use),
several elasticities and initial prices are displayed (for more details see previous sections). The initial prices after abatement (e.g. "after 80%") are actually the
marginal abatement price when the level of abatement is "80%" from the "no control state".
Most of the time, as in this example, the three curves were quite close one from
another and the assumption that the modeled "no control" marginal abatement curve
should be the same for the 3 regions seems to hold. As shown on table 8, the only sector
where the approximation could not be done is for the household transportation, where
EEC on the one hand, and EET and FSU on the other hand, were treated separately. The
fact that the basic abatement curve is similar for different regions for which we have data
provides some evidence that it may be possible to use these abatement curves for the
regions for which we do not have abatement data, that is, that different regions do face
similar technological choices for abating emissions.
Figure 10: Marginal Abatement Curves for the Use of Refined-Oil in the Industrial
Transportation Scenario: no Control Pollutant: PM2.5
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Another issue to be addressed, as mentioned in the last subsection, is the consistency
of the methodology of using theoretical "no control" abatement curves to derive
"baseline" marginal abatement curves. In the above example (figure 10), as current state
of control is not very high, our methodology works reasonably as one can see in table 8
(table 8 displays both the results of the "no control" regression over EEC, EET and FSU
and the "baseline" regression for EEC). Yet the level of control for coal combustion (as a
fuel for industrial combustion or as a fuel for power generation) is very high, sometimes
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higher than 95%, and using the "no control" curve regression as a base to generate
marginal abatement curves for countries with a high level of abatement might lead to
significant errors. That is, the curve is a best fit of the entire data range but not a
particular good fit for the range that may be relevant for some or most countries.
Let us take for example the use of coal in the ELEC sector: current level of abatement
is more than 90% for the developed countries and more than 75% for China for example
(see table 5 and 6 in section 3.2). As one can see on figure 11, the MAC curve is almost
flat until 80-90%, and nine tenths of the data points we are using reflects abatement
already realized (in the case of a developed country).
Figure 11: MAC curve for Coal Use for Power Generation, no Control Scenario, PM2.5
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To limit this type of issues, a way out is to perform the regression on the abatement
data that is located after 80-90% abatement (see figure 12). As one can see, the result of
the regression changes significantly when one does not take into account the first data
points of the curve. The first regression gives a result of 1.2 for the elasticity of
substitution whereas a regression without the first data points gives a result in the range
[0.6-0.8]. The main consequence of removing these first data points helps move to the
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left the modeled abatement curve in the range of [90%-100%] and to be closer to the
actual data (see figure 12); we indeed mostly care about by this part of the "no control"
curve. Consequently The [0%-100%] regression can be utilized for an undeveloped
country whereas the [80%-100%] regression could be used for a semi-developed country
and the [95%-100%] regression for a developed country.
Figure 12: MAC curve for Coal use for Power Generation, No control Scenario, PM 2.5,
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Finally, one could point out that no estimates are available for the AGRIC sector. In
the EPPA model, the AGRIC sector utilizes coal and refined-oil as a fuel. For those
specific activities (use of coal and refined oil), I used in the model the MAC curve I
modeled for industrial combustion. However, the bulk of agriculture emissions of BC and
other particulates is due to savannah burning, forest fires and agriculture fires. It was thus
assumed that no control option was available, which basically means that the elasticity of
substitution is equal to zero. Given the way emissions are modeled (see section 3.2), the
only way to respond to a constraint on an emission cap is to reduce the total sector output.
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Such a test would be of course nonsense, and we therefore do not subject this sector to
emissions in the simulations in subsequent chapters.
3.4 Model Results and Policy Simulations
Once I have modeled black carbon emissions and abatement opportunities, I perform
some diagnostic simulations to test the model structure. These tests provide a check to
see whether these new features are correctly implemented and that no error in the code
leads to some peculiar or false results. One of the tests is to compare general equilibrium
versus partial equilibrium results. The marginal abatement curves we built in the previous
section reflect the solving of a partial equilibrium, since there is no interaction with other
goods prices and quantities. The implementation within the model of the marginal
abatement curves enables us to observe general equilibrium effects. Next, the model
enables us to capture time trends, since some of the commodity prices (especially energy
prices) evolve over time. One can also check the implications of the vintaging process
(i.e. the non perfect malleability of capital). Finally, one can observe the effects of a
trading regime versus constraints by sector.
In brief, these tests tell us that both general equilibrium and time effects are
negligible, whereas both vintaging and trading effects are very important and need to be
considered when policy simulations are carried out in the next chapter.
3.4.1 General Equilibrium Effects
To compare general equilibrium and partial equilibrium, I present the results of the
model without vintaging, because in this case, we can see specifically the general
equilibrium effects. The basic purpose of this exercise is thus to reconstruct marginal
abatement curve for every sector/fuel/country with the EPPA model output. We can for
example set a constraint of 10% on a given sector (i.e. constraining the emissions to be at
90% of reference level), the model will simulate the level of emissions of course, but also
the equilibrium pollutant price, which is also the marginal abatement price. The EPPA-
generated abatement curves are constructed just this way, putting on successively higher
constraints, and noting the resulting prices.
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Figure 13: General -vs- Partial Equilibrium, U.S. Household sector in 1995
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Figures 13 show the result of the differences between partial and general equilibrium
abatement curves for the initial year of the EPPA model, that is to say 1995, for the
household sector. As one could have expected, for each sector and each type of fuel,
MAC curves derived from the output model (labeled "general" on the charts) are very
close - if not merged with - the MAC curves that were used to "feed" the model. This
demonstrates that general equilibrium effects are negligible. I only show here the results
for the household sector, but such calculations were done for each sector and the results
are essentially identical.
3.4.2 Time Effects
The next chart (figures 14) shows similar comparisons for the electric sector for the
year 2010 (that is to say after 4 loops of the model), a plausible target for policy
implementation.
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Figure 14: General -vs- Partial Equilibrium for the U.S. Electric Sector in 2010
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Contrary to the 1995 curves, "general" curves do not coincide with the "partial" curve
for each sectors and each fuel' , even if the reference level of emissions to calculate
abatement is the 2010 reference emissions, and not the 1995 one. This can be explained
by an increase of energy input prices in 2010 relatively to 1995. For the industrial sectors,
the phenomenon is accentuated in refined oil-related emissions compared to coal-related
emissions. In the reference run of the model - as expected- oil prices rise significantly
during that period (around 27%, while coal did increase only by 3-4%). Such changing
relative prices of inputs shift the model-derived MAC curves.
18 It could seem peculiar that the 'coal' curve is located higher than the 'refoil' curve. One should though
keep in mind that the prices presented in this chart are the BC ones. As BC is a very small share of PM in
coal-related emissions in the ELEC sector (unlike refoil in the ELEC sector), its marginal price is thus very
high compared to the marginal price of PM.
19 We only present in this subsection the results for one sector, ELEC. Identical observations can be made
for all the other sectors.
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3.4.3 The Vintaging Effects
As previously mentioned, all comparisons between partial and general equilibrium
made above used a particular feature of the model, which enables us to remove the effects
of the vintaging of capital. It was assumed that the totality of capital is perfectly
malleable, that is to say that after any 5-year period, firms can replace or update all their
equipment, and as a matter of fact, all emission control devices. This assumption, if very
helpful in theoretical studies like the one performed above, clearly does not hold in real
life. The EPPA model enables us to take into account the fact that not all capital is
perfectly malleable by fixing a part of it (around 30%) on four of the sectors (AGRIC,
ENERINT, OTHERIND, ELEC). When the capital is rigid, the choice of inputs cannot
be altered as a response to changing prices. This rigid capital remains with the same
emissions characteristics until it is fully depreciated. Only new and malleable capital can
change its emissions. EPPA models only a portion of capital as rigid to approximate the
idea that retrofitting is possible (for more information about the vintaging process, see
(Babiker et al., 2001)). In the same way, for the share of production that is associated
with the rigid part of the capital, abatement opportunities are modeled by an elasticity of
substitution between the pollutant and other inputs equal to zero (meaning that the only
way to reduce emissions, is to reduce the other input, say for example coal if the
emissions targeted are linked to coal-use).
Allowing a part of the capital to be vintaged basically imply that under new policies
that constrain emissions, control devices can be implemented only in a part of factories or
to a part of a the vehicle fleet. The cost of reaching a specified abatement in a particular
sector will thus be higher than if capital was perfectly malleable. Another consequence is
that a sector whose capital is vintaged cannot respond to a very tight constraint. That is, if
the constraint is so tight that even zero emissions from the malleable capital cannot meet
the constraint, then it is an infeasible constraint.
Figure 15 shows marginal abatement curves constructed through the output of the
model versus the original "partial" MAC curve. As expected, this time, the "general
equilibrium" curves are significantly to the left of the "partial equilibrium" curves. Also
as expected, the vertical line at 70% abatement acts as an asymptote for all the "general
equilibrium" curves. If one looks at the year when the policy is implemented, abatement
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of more than 70% cannot be achieved; marginal abatement prices tend toward the infinite
when abatement approaches 70%.
Finally, one can observe that the household sector marginal abatement curve (only
one is presented in figure 15, but the pattern persists for refine oil usage as well as for
biofuel use) is not affected. As the household sector as represented in the model does not
use capital, it is logical that it is not affected by the vintaging of it. One could possibly
argue that a similar feature should be implemented in the household sector. Indeed, the
use of such a feature in household consumption of refined oil would be appropriate since
new regulations on tailpipes, for example, are implemented on vehicles that are currently
built, but old vehicles still emit the way they used to. Such a feature is however not
currently available in EPPA and adding it was beyond the scope of this thesis.
Figure 15: General versus Partial Equilibrium with Capital Vintaging for Selected US Sectors
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3.4.3 Trading Effects
As one could have observed from the previous sections, most of abatement
opportunities for BC are linked to the fuel use in each sector. Thus, in each sector and for
each fuel use, abatement opportunities are defined by a specific initial price (that reflects
current policies) and a specific elasticity of substitution, which models the relationship
between abatement and marginal abatement cost. However, in the current version of the
EPPA model, constraints can be applied on a given sector, or on a given group of sectors,
but not by sector and fuel. The immediate consequence is that whenever one sets a
constraint over BC, prices of BC associated with coal, refined oil and/or biofuel will
equalize in that sector. Thus if one separately sets a constraint, which caps the emissions
to the 1995 levels on each of the sectors, one expects that the new equilibrium will yield a
gain for the sector and for the economy of the country as a whole (the process of
equalizing marginal abatement price leads to a lower global cost of pollution
mitigation) . Table 9 indicates the gain induced by "trading" across fuels within the
sector.
As one could have expected, when sectors are capped to their 1995 level in 1995
(allowing implicitly BC prices to be equalized across fuels, since constraints are set by
sector and initial prices differ across fuels), the welfare impact is positive. What this
basically means is that current policies are inefficient to curb BC emissions. Within the
same sector, say power generation for example, if oil-fired power plants were allowed to
emit more BC per unit of fuel and if coal-fired power plants were allowed to emit less BC
emissions per unit of fuel, then the global cost of BC emission mitigation for the sector as
a whole would be lower (for the same level of BC emissions) and the welfare impact (i.e.
the gain in household consumption) would be slightly positive. Furthermore, if trading is
allowed across industrial sectors (ELEC, ENERINT and OTHERIND), the positive
welfare impact will be even higher. Sectors that have a high cost of BC emission
reduction would thus emit more BC (reducing control devices costs) and sectors where
20 One should carefully notice at that point that the price equilibration is achieved in order to minimize BC
emissions mitigation costs. As noticed in chapter 2 of the thesis, BC is one of the numerous components of
PM2.5, and we can reasonably assume that PM emissions are abated in fixed proportions (each component is
abated by the same proportion). Consequently, the above equalization process does not keep the total PM2.5
emissions constant. If one wanted to look at the inefficiencies of urban pollution policies, then one would need
to set a global constraint on PM2.5, rather than on BC and the results would likely be quite different.
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this cost is lower would be more constrained. Because these pollutants are local and
regional, these different marginal costs may, in part, reflect different controls aimed at
different policy problems in different regions.
Table 9: Welfare Gain Induced by Trading
Welfare Impact
(from reference case)
Sector Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
OTHERIND <0.01%
ENERINT <0.01% 0.02% 0.03%
ELEC 0.01% or or
FINAL DEMAND 0.01% $0.97bn $1.46bn
Explanatory Note: Case 1 refers to policy simulation where only one sector (OTHERIND, ENERINT, ELEC
or FINAL DEMAND) is capped to its 1995 level, in 1995. Case 2 refers to a policy simulation where all
sectors are capped to their 1995 level in 1995, but trading across sectors is not allowed. Each sectors is subject
to a BC price independently of the other sectors. Finally, case 3 refers to a policy simulation where industrial
sectors, namely OTHERIND, ELEC and ENERINT, are capped to their 1995 level, and trading BC permits is
allowed across sectors.
48
4. MODEL RESULTS AND POLICY ANALYSIS
The primary purpose of introducing control costs of black carbon into the EPPA
model was to study the interaction of air pollution and climate policy. I first consider the
costs to controlling black carbon alone. I then consider how a black carbon and climate
policy might interact. I expect that there would be strong interactions among these
policies because fossil fuel combustion is a main source of emission of both black carbon
and carbon dioxide. The positive interaction between carbon policy and pollution policy
often has been termed 'ancillary benefits' of climate policy. As described earlier, the
ancillary benefits idea is not well defined. I develop a method for better estimating the
economic benefits of the policy interactions. In particular, I view the problem in terms of
cost-effectiveness of jointly implementing the policies, without an explicit evaluation of
the environmental benefits of either climate policy or pollution policy.
I then consider the issue of emission trading among sectors for black carbon and
consider whether this could result in higher levels of some other pollutants. I first develop
a simple analytical model to show this fact and then simulate the EPPA model.
4.1 Cost-Effectiveness of Joint Implementation of Policies
The BC control opportunities I implemented in the EPPA model enable us to
understand the impacts of a policy on BC (and to a certain extent other pollutants such as
PM2.5) on the economy and welfare. If the policy is set only on BC, then the cheapest
action is to implement control devices directly to the sources of emissions. Section 4.4.1
gives an example of a policy on BC implemented in the US. However, one should
carefully keep in mind that a change in the type of fuel can also induce a decrease in BC
emissions. For example, if a coal-fired power plant is replaced by an oil-fired power
plant, the same quantity of energy burnt will lead to a smaller amount of BC emissions.
When constraints are set on BC solely, switches of fuel typically do not happen since that
is more costly than implementing an end-of-pipe control device. In contrast, the only way
to induce a reduction in greenhouse gases emissions is to affect the quantity and the type
of fuel used (very few end-of-pipe solutions are currently available). It is more than likely
that if a more stringent BC policy is set (for air pollution mitigation purposes), it will be
go hand in hand with a carbon policy in order to curb Kyoto gases emissions. Through
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some simulations (section 4.1.2 and thereafter), we will thus be able to weigh up the
interactions between carbon policies and policies on BC emissions (and to a larger extent
PM emissions). Indeed, I first estimate the costs of each policy separately and add the
costs together. Then, I estimate the cost of doing the policy jointly. Finally, I quantify the
savings of doing them jointly by calculating the difference.
4.1.1 An Example of BC Policy for the USA
The first step in our analysis is to simulate a plausible policy on BC in order to weigh
up the costs induced by such a policy. I will focus on a single country, the U.S. as an
example. The policy I consider is a cap on BC for the industrial sectors (ENERINT,
OTHERIND and ELEC) at their 1995 levels. Each sector is capped independently. To
forecast reference emissions of BC, I further assume that in the case of fossil fuel-related
emissions, emission factors remain constant over time, in order to capture all the costs of
responses to the policy. This is a reversed approach from the standard version of the
EPPA model. In the standard version, of EPPA as described in Mayer et al. (2000), a
relationship between per capita income and the emission factors is used. But this is used
as a proxy for strengthening controls on pollution as incomes rise. With the introduction
of control costs I can explicitly model these policies. Non-fossil fuel-related emissions
are assumed to grow somewhat proportionally to the output growth (for ENERINT) and
bio-fuel-related emissions are assumed to stay constant over time.
Figure 16 shows what BC emissions would be if emission factors remain constant
and also show the cap we are going to apply on BC. Under such a policy, BC prices rise
as can be shown in figure 17.
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Figure 16: "Reference" BC Emissions for the USA and a Plausible Cap for Three Sectors
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Figure 17: Evolution of BC prices by sector, for the US, under BC-only policy
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As one can see from figure 16, under the reference scenario, emissions in the
industrial sectors increase by a factor 3 between 1995 and 2060. The cap we apply in our
policy simulation is thus binding. In figure 17, BC prices in the three capped sectors rise
substantially and a wide difference is to be seen between the three sectors. First, one
should keep in mind that at the same time, GDP and sector outputs also experience rapid
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growth. Next, it is not surprising that the prices in the ELEC sector are larger than in the
two other sectors since ELEC is the sector that consumes the largest amount of fossil
fuels and it is also the sector that has currently the more efficient (and more costly)
removal devices. Finally the welfare impact (percentage loss) on the US can be seen on
figure 18. The impact is continuously rising until 2060, where it reaches -0.40%.
Figure 18: USA Welfare Impact of the BC-only Policy
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4.1.2 Gain from a Joint Policy
Once we have set our example policy on BC emissions and looked at the impact of
such a policy, we can now observe the interactions between a BC-only policy and a
carbon policy. For that purpose, we can look at a Kyoto-like policy. One of the options
available in the EPPA model is to cap the emissions of the annex B countries at a level
defined by the Kyoto protocol (i.e. a bit lower than 1990 emissions), beginning in 2010,
and allow trading of emissions permits between annex B countries. As explained in the
introduction of the chapter, such a policy induces a restructuring of the energy demand
for the different sectors in the economy. Sectors are forced to switch to less carbon-
intensive energy sources, and consequently, it possibly induces a decrease in BC
emissions. Similarly, a BC-only policy may induce structural change in the energy
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consumption when the cost of abating BC linked to a specific fuel becomes too high.
Figures 19, 20 and 21 show the impact on BC emissions of the two policies Kyoto-
trading and BC-only policy that we just set.
Figure 19: Impact of policies of BC emissions in the OTHERIND sector
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From the three above figures, we can weigh up the impact of a Kyoto-trading policy
on BC emissions. As expected, the Kyoto-type policy induces a drop in BC emissions,
but not enough to force the emissions to go below 1995 levels. The impact is the larger
for the ELEC sector, since it is the sector the most affected by a Kyoto-type policy (in
terms of energy use structure). Table 10 and 11 give a more detailed indication of the
effects of this "carbon policy" on BC emissions and on the impact of BC-only policy on
fuel structure. Interestingly enough, the impact of the BC-only policy on fuel
consumption is quite significant, especially for the use of refined oil in the ELEC sector.
Such an impact indicates that the price of abating BC becomes so high that the power
sector would modify its energy demand structure.
Table 10: % Change in BC Emissions when Kyoto-Trading Policy is Implemented
Year ELEC ENER OTHERIND
2010 -23.7% -14.6% -11.6%
2015 -27.9% -15.7% -12.5%
2020 -31.9% -17.1% -12.1%
2025 -36.1% -18.7% -12.5%
2030 -40.1% -20.4% -12.4%
2035 -43.9% -21.9% -14.1%
2040 -47.1% -22.4% -15.7%
2045 -50.6% -23.0% -16.6%
2050 -52.3% -22.2% -16.2%
2055 -54.0% -21.7% -16.0%
2060 -55.7% -21.3% -15.6%
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Table 11: Percentage Change in Fuel Consumption when BC-only Policy is Applied
ELEC ENER OTHERIND
Year COAL REFOIL COAL REFOIL COAL REFOIL
2010 -2.8% -8.9% 0.5% -0.3% -4.2% -0.2%
2015 -2.4% -9.7% -0.1% -0.3% -3.8% -0.2%
2020 -2.1% -10.8% -0.5% -0.2% -3.5% -0.2%
2025 -1.6% -12.1% -0.9% -0.2% -3.2% -0.2%
2030 -1.0% -13.5% -1.1% -0.1% -2.8% -0.1%
2035 -0.4% -15.3% -1.3% -0.1% -2.4% -0.1%
2040 0.1% -17.1% -1.2% 0.1% -2.1% 0.0%
2045 -0.4% -19.2% -2.0% -0.2% -2.5% -0.2%
2050 -0.2% -20.2% -1.9% -0.2% -2.3% -0.2%
2055 0.1% -21.0% -1.8% -0.2% -2.0% -0.3%
2060 0.3% -21.6% -1.6% 0.0% -1.8% -0.2%
The two policies I chose to implement pursue two different goals, one aimed at
limiting Kyoto gases and the other aimed at limiting BC emissions. The next step is then
to see the effect of a joint policy on Kyoto gases and BC. Our policy will cap the
emissions of greenhouse gases at the level defined by the Kyoto protocol (trading within
annex B countries is allowed) beginning in 2010 and BC emissions are capped at their
1995 level beginning in 1995. As two policies are implemented jointly, the effect on
welfare will be greater than the input of either of the policies taken separately. Yet it is
interesting to compare the sum of the welfare impact of the two policies taken separately
and the welfare impact of the joint policy. Such a comparison may enable us to highlight
a gain from a joint policy, meaning that the joint goal may be achieved at a cost cheaper
than the sum of the costs of the two separate policies. Figure 22 presents the evolution of
the welfare impact of the three policies. As expected, the joint policy is indeed cheaper to
the society that a "theoretical" sum of the two separate policies. As one can see on figure
23, the gain represents in 2030 more than 30% of the cost for the society to keep BC
emissions constant, but accounts for less than 5% of the costs of the two separate
policies.
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Figure 22: Welfare Impacts of Separate Policies and Joint Policies2
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Figure 23: Gain from Joint Policy
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21 To be able to compare the Kyoto policy and our BC-only policy, we had to slightly modify the Kyoto-
trading policy to get round the issue of the trading across fuel use within economic sectors under BC
constraint (this peculiarity generates welfare gain, see section 3.4.3). For that purpose, we ran a standard
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The basic finding then is that there are interactions among these policies But rather
than consider one set of benefits as ancillary to the other, I have considered this as a
problem where we jointly achieve the two policies. Because each policy affects the other,
it is not possible to attribute the savings to one or the other policy.
To further determine how my results depend on the particular policies I have chosen,
I next consider two other cases. First, I look at the effect of a more stringent policy on
black carbon. Second, I look at the effects of a Kyoto-policy where trading is not allowed
between annex B countries, which means for the U.S. a more stringent carbon policy.
Figures 24 and 25 show the welfare impacts of these new policies (BC-only and joint
policy) and the gain as a share of total welfare loss when one implements a more
stringent policy on BC. As expected, the more stringent policy is of course more costly to
the society. It is worthwhile though, to notice the impact on the share of the gain
generated by a joint policy. The gain as a share of BC-only policy welfare loss as well as
the gain as a share of the sum of the two separate policies is indeed lower than in our
above standard policy.
Another interesting question is the impact of a more stringent carbon policy. For that
purpose, a plausible policy on greenhouse gases is a Kyoto-type policy where trading
among annex B countries is not allowed. When trading is not allowed, the cost for the
USA is indeed bigger since they cannot buy emission permits to countries that have
cheaper opportunities to reduce greenhouse gases emissions. Figures 26 and 27 show the
welfare impacts of these new policies (BC-only22 and joint policy) and the gain as a share
of total welfare loss. In this case, the gain in dollar-terms of the joint policy is far higher.
This can be explained by the fact that a tighter policy on carbon emissions will lead to a
larger decrease in fuel-related BC emissions and the abatement necessary to respond our
BC policy will be much lower. Yet the share of the gain from the policy with respect to
BC-only policy costs and with respect to the sum of the two separate policies is hugely
increasing. The fact that the gain from the joint policy as a share of the BC-only policy
costs is close to 100% between 2010 and 2025 basically means that the targets we set in
version of "Kyoto-trading" and re-ran it while constraining BC emissions at their current level under
"Kyoto-trading" (that we were able to calculate thanks to the first run).22 The BC-only policy we are looking at here is the same as our standard BC-only policy, meaning that BC
emissions are to be lower than their 1995 levels in each industrial sector.
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the BC-only policy and in the joint policy are reached by only the constraint on
greenhouse gases emissions (that is to say the Kyoto-no trade policy). The gain as a share
of the two separate policies costs is also far higher, almost reaching 20%, compared with
the average 5% in our standard policy simulation (see figure 27).
Figure 24: Welfare Impacts of Separate Policies and Joint Policies - Tighter Policy on BC
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Figure 26: Welfare Impacts of Separate Policies and Joint Policies - "Kyoto - no Trading"
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Figure 27: Gain from Joint Policy - "Kyoto - no Trading"
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4.2 Pollution Impacts of a Climate Policy on Black Carbon
4.2.1 Introduction on Fixed Proportions Emissions
In the previous section, we looked at the interactions between carbon policy and BC-
only policy, without specifying what our aim was when limiting BC emissions. As
mentioned in the section 2.5, BC emissions may lead to an increase in the greenhouse
effect, but also to an increase in pollution and as a direct consequence may cause serious
human health damages. In section 4.1, we actually looked at policies that focus on the
level of BC emissions, and not at all particulate matter emissions. If the target were on
PM2.5, the results in terms of welfare impact, but also in terms of PM2.5 emissions and
in terms of human health damages would be different. The following section will thus
explore the interactions between climate policies and urban pollution policies when types
of policies differ, especially when the policy-maker allows pollution permit trading.
As previously mentioned, emissions come from a wide variety of sources but one can
notice a recurrent pattern in those emissions. The Leontief (fixed proportions) nature of the
production function results from the fact that, at least as an approximation, control devices
abate PM, reducing all the components in the same proportions. It is also the case that fixed
proportions relationship is very different across sectors and fuels. Table 12 provides the
example of four types of emissions sources that have very different fractions of BC and
other components. Based on these data, concern about BC could lead one to divert their
attention mainly toward mobile sources that use refined oil (mainly diesel) and residential
coal whereas concern about PM would look for control measures on all sources.
Table 12: BC Fractions across some of the Emission Sources 23
Sector Residential Coal Mobile sources Coal pulverized Average
(bituminous) (refined oil) (industrial industrial
combustion) processes
(no fuel use)
BC fraction 50% -40% 0.5% -1%
Other PM2.5 50% -60% 99.5% -99%
fraction
23 Not all sources of BC and PM emissions are displayed on that table. The goal here is to show emission
sources at both extremes in terms of BC/OPM shares
24 Non fuel emissions from chemical manufacturing, primary metal production, mineral products, pulp and
paper, petroleum refineries and cement
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4.2.2 A Model of Pollution in Production
Consider the case of PM where the policy maker is concerned about its health effects
but also the fact that a component (BC) has climate effects. And recognize as described in
the previous section that these emissions are produced by the same processes. Given the
assessment of the seriousness of these two problems, the policy maker might set a cap on
the level of emissions for BC or a cap on the level of emissions of PM. This policy maker
may also consider specific sectoral targets without trading or a policy that would allow
trading of either PM or BC emissions (but not across those two pollutants because at this
point, we do not have a way to compare these efforts). Our questions here are: Is it
possible that introducing a trading system could have the unintended consequences of
increasing a pollution problem? Is it possible to achieve independent targets exactly?
The EPPA model is useful as a way of evaluating how the costs of these policies
interact and how one policy may affect emissions of other pollutant. However, its
complicated structure in terms of production functions means that some of the particular
results are not always transparent.
Here, let us consider a simple model that represents this problem to see how it affects
the optimal pollution policies and what they would achieve. I will first prove that under
certain conditions (economic structure, pollutant interrelationships, policy
implementation), one cannot meet exactly separate targets on each of the two pollutants.
In other words, the policy-maker has to give up at least one of its objectives on pollution
control. Then, in the second part, I will show the implications of global constraint
policies (i.e. allowing trading across sectors) versus sector constraint policies (i.e. each
sector is bound by its own emissions target); when the policy-maker chooses one
pollutant to be controlled, then the way he implements the policy has consequences on
how the other pollutant will be controlled. Finally, in a last part, I will try to extend those
results to the EPPA model.
4.2.2.1. Setting up the Model
Let us consider two production sectors with nested constant elasticity of substitution
(CES) functions. Each sector uses different kinds of inputs (labor, capital, energy and
other inputs), and emits two pollutants, which we represent as inputs into production
(Babiker et al, 2001).
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Now suppose that there are two sorts of pollutants, black carbon (BC) and other
particulate matter (OPM), emitted in each sector. Let us assume that those two pollutants
are emitted in fixed proportions one with another (meaning that PM is a Leontief
composite) but the relative shares of the two pollutants differ across the two sectors.
Pollution abatement occurs through substitution of a composite of other inputs and
depends on the value of Y. This thesis indeed (see section 3) follows up on Hyman (2001)
and shows that one can choose a to approximate marginal abatement curves derived from
detailed engineering data. 25
Figure 28: Sector Production Functions
Sector 1 Sector 2
Output I Output 2
Leontief Leontief
Composite Composite
BC OPM X BC OPM X
(Other Inputs) (Other Inputs)
For i equal to 1 or 2, let us define pbc' and BC' the price and quantity of BC in sector i
and popmi and OPM' the price and quantity of OPM in sector i.
If there were no constraints on these pollutants the initial price would be zero but we
are interested in cases where emissions are constrained separately in each sector and then
when emission trading is introduced. We want to implement a policy that restricts
emissions of BC and OPM. Let us thus call Pbci (resp. Popm1 ) and Qbci (resp. Qopm1) the
reference (i.e. initial) price and quantity of BC (resp. OPM) in sector i.
Our goal in the rest of this section is to lay down the conditions under which an
equilibrium can be reached under a trading system when the policy-maker tries to impose
25 In this simple model, we disregard the output effect, assuming as it is generally the case, that control of
emissions is almost entirely from substitution with little effect on output
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limits on both BC and OPM emissions. The result we are looking for is intuitively very
straightforward. As the initial prices and elasticities of substitution differ between the two
sectors, and as the proportion BC/OPM is different between the two sectors, one would
think there should be very few cases where separate constraints on BC and OPM can be
exactly met under a trading regime. This intuitive argument can be verified by a short
mathematical demonstration.
Our policy aims at reducing the emissions by a certain percentage. Let us assume (to
simplify the computation, though it does not affect the result), that we want to reduce the
two pollutants emissions by the same percentage, K. Our policy thus implies the
following constraints:
BC 1 +BC 2  (1-K)(Q' +Q2)
OPM 1 +OPM 2  (1- K)(Q' + 2 )
OPM + opm
Let us further name k, and k2 the abatement realized in sector 1 and sector 2
respectively, where there is emissions trading across sectors. There is a priori no reason
why we would have k1=k2=K. However, in an optimal trading system, we expect a single
permit price so that the marginal cost of abatement is equal across sectors. In the
following demonstration, we are going to study the effects of a trading system.
At the equilibrium, one has:
Pb, = = Pbc (1la)
1 2 n (b
Popm = Pop = popm (1b)
4.2.2.2. Solving for the Equilibrium
As BC and OPM are part of the same Leontieff composite, we can write that for each sector:
PM' = BC'+ OPM
and PI PMc Qc Pc
Qbc + OPM
i Qpm i a a 1
or P Q P Popm OPM Popm
c Qpm
At the equilibrium, under the assumption that BC and OPM are tightened by a
Leontieff structure, only one constraint is binding -though both constraints can be met-.
In other words, only one price - PBC or pOPM - will be non-zero. The other pollutant will
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be abated, but at price equal to zero, and in fixed proportions. Let us assume for the rest
of the demonstration that the constraint is -for example - binding for pollutant BC 26.
Next, let us remind that an expression of the price of the pollutant as a function of the
abatement realized was derived in section 3.3.2. We saw at that time that it could be
written, in the case of PM, as:
PPM (A PM =P,(2) (1- A)
The price for BC in sector i is:
Pb, Pbc (3)1-k
(I a) and (3) would imply in that case:
Pb1 j 1 J2i (4a)
P ~ 1 k =P 1- bC(Ik2
We have:
qI +q 2 =(I-KXQ +Q2)
qOpm + qOpm = (1 - KXQpm + Qpm)
And also, for i=1,2:
qbc= (l- ki )Qb,
qOpm = (1- k )Q,PM
Which implies:
kia,' +k2 a 2 = K (4b)
ka,,, +k 2 a = K (4c)
An equilibrium solution has thus to be consistent with equations (4a), (4b) and (4c), with
only two variables, k1 and k2.
Let us compute A, the determinant of the system (4b)-(4c).
2 1 _ QOcpm ~b G QOmbc = P a ,bc,, a M a., 1 2 1 2( + Q.,.b +) .m2het st tco antom -s b g Mit7 onBC)
26 teresult does not change if the constraint is binding on OPM, if not on BC
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A#0= QQm Qbc pm
2 Q2
Thus, if BC and OPM are emitted in different proportions in two sectors, then we have
A0 and we can assert that there exists a unique solution to the system (4b)-(4c).
One can easily verify that the unique solution is
k, =k 2 = K (5)
Now if we try to re-inject (5) into (4a), we have (still under the assumption that the
constraint is binding on BC):
VK E [0,11K a' U2 = Pbc (6)
Pbc
Which is equivalent to (if we want to be able to modify K):
a- = a 2 and Pb = Pbc
Thus, there is a structure where both pollutant constraints are just met but it requires
that the initial prices and the elasticity of substitution are identical across sectors. This
could happen only by coincidence. The elasticities of substitution highly depend on the
structure of the economic sector and the type of emission sources of the sector and as
such, they vary widely across sector. And, if there have been separate policies in each
sector, initial prices (e.g. PbcI and Pbc2) need not to be equal. However, even if we
considered a case where we started with no control in either sector so that PbcI =Pbc2 =0,
we still need a 1 =G2. Initial prices mostly reflect policies that are currently implemented
as well the share of BC in total particulate matters. In the same way, it is unlikely that
those two numbers be equal.
Again the mathematical proof demonstrates the fairly intuitive result that it is not
possible to reach an equilibrium price that enables to meet exactly the constraints on both
BC and OPM, when they are described by a Leontieff structure. A policy maker might
then set a policy on just one of these pollutants (on the one that binds) and meet (in fact
more than meet) environmental objectives for the other pollutant. Based on the
mathematics developed so far, I would like to consider the following problem. Suppose
the policy maker had set up sector-by-sector constraints for one of these pollutants
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thereby controlling emissions of both of them. Further suppose the policy maker would
like to introduce a trading system for the first pollutant. Our question is: What happens to
the second pollutant that was controlled indirectly because of constraints on the first
pollutant?
4.2.3 Trading -vs- No Trading across Sectors
4.2.3.1 Different Policies Imply Different Effects
Let us assume that the policy-maker sets the two following "sector constraints" on
BC in sector 1 and in sector 2:
(7)
qbc -( (- K2 bc
BC will thus be emitted at the equilibrium with the following quantity:
qbe = ese + qb 2 =(I - K)Qlc +(I- K2 )Q, (8a)
Given the Leontieff structure that tightens BC and OPM together in both sectors, OPM
will thus be emitted with:
qopm = (1- K, )Qm + (1- K 2 ),2, (8b)
Now suppose the policy-maker sets a "global constraint" on BC, that is to say, that he
or she constrains the total emissions of BC in sector 1 and sector 2 to be below a certain
level, say (1-KI)Qbc' + (1-K2)Qbc2
BC level of emissions remains the same27.
qb, = 1bc 4qbc2'=(1- K,)Qc +(1- K 2 )Qbc (9a)
Once again, the Leontieff structure between both pollutants implies that OPM
emission level will be:
1 !0QOpm 2 , OP (9b
,opm 'bc ' +qbC "p' (9b)
Qbc Qbc
Let us show that the level of OPM emissions will be different in the case of a global
constraint than in the case of sector constraints. Once again, as in section 4.2.2, intuition
tells us that the result is straightforward and that only highly unlikely conditions may lead
27 For the rest of the section, the 'prime' notation means the quantities are linked to the trading system
rather than the sector constraint
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to identical OPM emissions under the two policies. For that purpose, let us go once again
through a short mathematical demonstration and let us make a proof by contradiction and
assume that the economy will emit the same amount of OPM in both cases (assuming of
course it emits the same amount of BC).
We have thus:
qOpm = lOpm
which is equivalent to (using (8b) and (9b)):
Q 2(l-K)Q ,,,+(l-K 2 )Q 2m = q1, ' "" b 2
+c Qbe
1_ __p 2 ,Q 2 m
qac -(1- K2)Q o+"" (1- K 2 )Qq abc 2O +q 2 Qb2Q1  1Qbc bac bac Ga
Q2  Q1  Q2  Q1 1
( -m - opm q2~ OPM opm2 bc[Q 2  Q~I L Q I
We can reasonably assume once again that both gases are emitted in different
proportions across sectors, which means that the expressions inside the squared brackets
on both sides of the equality are not null. Thus, we have:
OPm = q2'=(1 - K2 )Q2 = q2 (10a)
and q j'=(1-KI)Qc =qbc (10b)
(10a) and (10b) imply however that BC will be abated in sectors 1 and 2 in the same way
(i.e. under the same proportions) under the global constraint and under the sector
constraint.
Global and sector constraints are thus equivalent if and only if (1-K1)QI=qc 1 verifies
(see equation (4a) in section 4.2.2.1):
Pb I(QC b 2 - bcIb Ibc q
bc bec
I P 2 1
q cb c 2bc -qbcY2Jb U
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With P1c2, Pc2 QcI Qc 2, a,, Y2 and qbc fixed, the above equality is verified only for a unique
qbc I [O,qbc] (a proof of that can be given by computing the derivate of the function with qc I as
a variable).
Thus, global and sectoral constraints on BC can (of course) achieve the same goals in
terms of BC emissions, but the effects on the level of emissions of the second pollutant
that is described by a Leontieff structure depends on the choice of the policy (global or
sector constraint).
4.2.3.2 A Disturbing Implication
Let us simulate a very simple policy. Let us assume that the policy-maker sets a
global constraint on BC and allows trading across sectors. Let us further assume that he
or she simply constrains the emissions to be at their current level (so that they do not
increase in the future, for example).
If PbcI and Pbc2 are equal, then respective emissions in sector 1 and sector 2 will
remain constant. However, if they are different (say Pbc > Pbc 2), then equation (7a)
constraint will imply an increase in BC emissions in sector 1 and a decrease in sector 2,
while the global BC emissions remain constant. However, the emissions of OPM will be
defined by (see equation (12b)):
, 1 ,q pm 2 , Opm
qopm ~Jbc 1 2bc 
bc bc
If q1c '= Q 5 + (with 6 > 0 ), then q c '= Q2 - 6 (global BC emissions remain constant)
Thus with have
Q Q2
,_p's Qopm_ Qtprn +Qi +Q2OPm Q1 opm Opm
bc I bc
(Q1  2
bc
actually met when OPM emits more proportionally in sector 1 than in sector 2.
Consequently, while the policy-maker introduces trading over BC permits to lower
the global cost of climate change mitigation, he might actually increase by a significant
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quantity the OPM emissions provided that BC is initially more costly to abate in sector 1
and that OPM emits proportionally more in sector 1 than in sector 2.
Thus, under the conditions described above it is possible that the introduction of a
trading system for one pollutant would increase emissions of another pollutant. Of course
the opposite case where the other pollutant is reduced may also occur. The policy-maker
can therefore set targets on only one of the two pollutants and observe the reduction
implications on the other pollutant. Allowing trading across sectors can achieve the same
abatement as sector constraints for the pollutant one chose to control, but in a more
efficient way (i.e. at a lower cost). However, allowing the trading implies a loss of
control on the other pollutant, which will be almost surely abated in the different way
under a global constraint on the controlled pollutant rather than under a sector constraint
on the controlled pollutant. Such policies might actually lead to an increase in the other
pollutant emissions. Section 4.2.3 will consider whether this can actually occur within the
framework of the EPPA model.
One could have also thought of this problem in terms of costs rather than physical
quantities. The policy maker could introduce the trading system and force the two
pollutants to be below their 1995 levels (i.e. one of the two constraints would then be
more than met). One could similarly show that for some cases, the gain generated by the
trading system can be offset by the loss due the fact that one of the constraints would be
more than met. Indeed, I previously showed that both constraints cannot be met at the
same time.
4.2.3 Implementation in the EPPA Model
To apply the analytical results I developed in the previous section, I consider two
policies for two different regions, the U.S. and the European Union (EU). In practical
terms, for those two regions, I implemented similar policies as the ones described in
section 4.1, that is to say that we cap the three industrial sectors (ELEC, ENERINT,
OTHERIND) to their 1995 level forever. Then we look at two different types of policies,
one where the constraint is applied by sector (meaning that each sector individually
responds to its constraint), and another one where the constraint is applied globally on the
three sectors (meaning that sectors can exchange emission permits in order to lower the
global cost of BC emission mitigation.
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Introducing trading across sectors always yield substantial benefits. In that case, the
benefit from trading can be evaluated at $0.5bn both for the USA and for the European
Union. Nonetheless, the effects on the other pollutant, that is to say OPM, differ for the
two regions. The type of policy implemented on BC does not affect the global level of
emissions for BC as the constraints are set on BC. However, the Leontief structure
between BC and OPM implies that any action on BC emissions has consequences on
OPM emissions. As a trading regime modifies the structure of BC emissions though
keeping them constant overall, a trading regime will have ancillary effects on OPM.
Table 14 shows the level of emissions of BC and OPM under the two regimes for the
E.U. and as one can see the introduction of a trading regime yields significant welfare
gains and also causes a decrease in OPM emissions. However it is not the case for the
U.S. As one can see with table 13, introduction of the trading regime causes an increase
on OPM emissions (by 20kT).
Table 1328: Comparisons of Trading -vs- No Trading for the U.S.
BC emissions (MT) OPM emissions (MT) Ratio
Sector Fuel Constraint Trading across Constraint by Trading across BC/PM
by sector sectors sector sectors
ELEC Coal 0.010 0.017 0.088 0.153 0.1
Refoil 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.55
ENERINT Coal 0.006 0.003 0.054 0.023 0.1
Refoil 0.024 0.016 0.020 0.013 0.55
Process 0.008 0.008 0.203 0.195 0.04
OTHERIND Coal 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.1
Refoil 0.329 0.333 0.269 0.272 0.55
Total Emissions 0.378 0.378 0.635 0.659 N/A
Sources: EPPA output, Author's calculation and Streets (2001) and California EPA for ratios
Although this short example does not provide a very high and significant pollution
impact due to policy choice (the increase in OPM emissions is less than 10% of the
reference level), it indicates that the actions taken on one specific pollutant to reduce
control costs might result in greater damages from another pollutant. Or, if there were a
constraint on that pollutant, greater cost might be required to control it, partly offsetting
the gain realized from introducing trading for the other pollutant. The very fact that the
28 For consistency reasons, the BC inventory used in that attempt slightly differ from the ones used in
previous sections
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composition of PM varies a lot across sectors tells us that under certain specific
conditions, these effects would be large.
Table 14: Comparisons of Trading -vs- No Trading for the E.U.
BC emissions (MT) OPM emissions (MT) Ratio
Sector Fuel Constraint Trading across Constraint by Trading across BC/PM
by sector sectors sector sectors
ELEC Coal 0.005 0.006 0.046 0.054 0.1
Refoil 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.55
ENERINT Coal 0.005 0.000 0.042 0.003 0.1
Refoil 0.006 0.002 0.005 0.002 0.55
Process 0.011 0.009 0.093 0.071 0.11
OTHERIND Coal 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.1
Refoil 0.091 0.100 0.074 0.081 0.55
Total Emissions 0.125 0.125 0.268 0.217 N/A
Sources: EPPA output, Author's calculation and Streets (2001) and California EPA for ratios
4.3 Caveats
I attempted to model BC and OPM emissions as realistically as possible given the
structure of EPPA and available data but there are many limitations. While we have
demonstrated some of the complex interactions between climate and air pollution policies
that might occur, one must be cautious about specific empirical estimates. An obvious
limitation of this report is the country-oriented structure of the economic model used to
estimate costs. The EPPA model is a useful tool to value climate policy costs, but the
high level of country aggregation limits the ability to deal with air pollution mitigation
modeling. It may provide a rough approximation of the costs of an air pollution policy at
the country level but air pollution is mainly a local phenomenon. Treating air pollution at
the country level implies indeed that we do not make a difference between a certain
amount of pollution equally spread over the territory of a large country like the U.S. and
the same amount of pollution concentrated in a single city in the U.S. Further work on the
subject should thus attempt to treat the same question more locally.
One must be cautious as well about some other limitations of our way to model
abatement costs. The underlying assumption is that the marginal abatement curves are
themselves not affected by carbon policies. I assumed that the marginal abatement curve
for a given sector and a given fuel is the same under no carbon policy and under a Kyoto-
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like policy. In real life, this may not be true. The use of fuel in the household sector
provides, here, a good example to highlight the limits of our modeling. Indeed, a carbon
policy would push towards more efficiency in fuel use. In the case of household
transportation, this might mean a switch from gasoline to diesel, since diesel is far more
efficient. Yet BC diesel emissions per gallons of fuel exceed by one or two orders of
magnitude BC gasoline emissions per gallon of fuel. If a policy were then implemented
on PM at the same time, what would be the most efficient measure: a switch back to
gasoline and with improved efficiency of gasoline motors, or the implementation of end-
of-pipe devices on the diesel motors? Our way of modeling BC abatement clearly does
not take into account this interaction.
The methodologies I developed in this thesis may not indeed model realistically BC
emissions and abatement and is subject to limitations. Yet, once we acknowledge these
limitations, this report provides new ways to think about climate and air pollution
interactions and the quantitative results we found may at least provide an idea about the
orders of magnitude.
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5. CONCLUSION
In this thesis, I examine the interactions between air pollution policies and climate
policies. Climate change and air pollution are linked because they are both partly caused
by the burning of fossil fuels. This report utilizes the features of the EPPA model
developed at the MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change
(JPSPGC), to look at two different types of policies, carbon policies and air pollution
policies, and at their interactions. As the main focus of the EPPA model is the climate
issue, a first required step was to include new features on the model so that urban
pollution abatement opportunities could be taken into account and these costs estimated.
Particular attention was given to particulate matter and a component of it, black carbon,
since black carbon has radiative properties that are partly responsible for the greenhouse
effect and at the same time it has physical properties that have serious impacts on human
health.
After having laid the foundations of a framework to assess abatement opportunities
for these pollutants, I reached several conclusions. First, this study provides an efficient
tool to quantify the costs at national scale to achieve in the future targets on urban
pollutants and compare these costs to climate policy costs. The costs of keeping constant
over time the emissions of BC, and to a larger extent particulate matter, is found to be far
smaller than costs of a typical climate policy such as the ones suggested by the Kyoto
Protocol.
Next, this thesis develops a methodology to weigh up the interactions between air
pollution policies and climate policies. The EPPA model enables us to value the welfare
impact of a policy that cap particulate matter at their 1995 level and as well the welfare
impact of a Kyoto-like policy. Its structure also allows us to value the welfare cost
impacts of a policy that would set these two targets at the same time, which we refer as a
"joint policy". The cost savings from such a joint policy can be measured by subtracting
the welfare cost of the joint policy from the theoretical sum of the costs of the two
separate policies. This thesis raises the question of whether we can allocate these savings
to one or the other policy. Because the gains are jointly produced, it is not strictly
possible to allocate them to either the climate policy or the pollution policy. We
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implemented this policy only in the U.S., as an example and found the savings to be less
than 5% of the total costs of implementing the policies separately but this rose to almost
20% with a more stringent climate policy.
Finally, I separately showed that introduction of a trading system for one pollutant
can worsen emissions of another pollutant in some cases. This result was demonstrated
analytically and for an empirical example. The empirical example involved a hypothetical
policy where black carbon was controlled for climate purposes. With a trading system
introduced in BC between the sectors of the economy both for the U.S. and the E.U., we
found that the total particulate matter emissions increased in the U.S. while it decreased
in the E.U.
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